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Comments from Chris Gerrard and Markus Palenberg 
on the Options Team Report Draft 2 — 
Options for CGIAR Governing Structures and Decision 
Making (version of March 16, 2015) 
Washington DC and Munich, March 22, 2015 
We welcome the opportunity to comment further on the Team’s second draft. As before, our 
comments come from having led the first two CRP evaluations in the reformed CGIAR on 
CRP6 and CRP2 — Forests, Trees and Agroforestry (FTA) and Policies, Institutions and 
Markets (PIM), respectively. We have also led or overseen reviews of four of the comparator 
partnerships during the last five years and have participated as governance experts in three 
CGIAR Challenge Program evaluations.  
The team has done a good job of further laying out the legal, programmatic and fiduciary 
implications of each of the options, as a result of which we have changed our preference 
from option 3 to option 2 with the Consortium keeping its fiduciary responsibilities for the 
use of CRP funding. We also have extensive comments on paras. 257 to 269 on the IEA.  
Comments on the Suggested Options 
Options 1 and 2 are very similar, the only difference being the provision for joint annual 
meeting of the Consortium Board and the Fund Council. Since we think that this would be a 
good idea, we prefer option 2 to option 1. 
Regarding footnote 12 in para. 127, we do not think it is practical to separate programmatic 
and fiduciary responsibility at this level. If fiduciary responsibility for the use of CRP 
funding is removed from the Consortium, it is unlikely that the Consortium will exercise 
much programmatic responsibility either. Therefore, the essential choice among the two-
board options is for the Consortium Board to exercise programmatic and fiduciary 
responsibilities (options 1 and 2), or the Fund Council to do so (option 3). 
There is considerable discussion, starting in para. 138, about reducing the number of voting 
members on the Fund Council from 26 to 16. The draft should discuss the size and 
composition of the Consortium Board. Para. 128 (in option 1) proposes that this be 
comprised of Center Board members, Center DGs, CRP Directors, and independent 
members, and para. 190 (in option 3) proposes that this comprise only Center Board 
members and Center DGs. Neither paragraph mentions anything about size, but the 
arguments against an unwieldy Fund Council (starting in para. 144) also apply to the 
Consortium Board. We think it is important for the Consortium Board to comprise both 
representatives of the Centers and independent members, including an independent chair. We 
would suggest only one voting member from each Center (either the DG or a Center Board 
member, this being each Center’s choice), and six independent members including the 
independent chair. We fail to see a justification for including CRP Directors on the 
Consortium Board. We would suggest that the independent members be appointed in their 
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professional capacities, while seeking those with professional backgrounds who could also 
serve as chairs to the various subcommittees of the Board. These suggestions would apply 
under both options 1-2 and option 3. 
Para. 204 (in option 3) indicates that the Fund Office would provide both programmatic and 
financial oversight. First of all, this needs to be further explained and spelled out, since it 
seems to be inconsistent with para. 79, which says “the Fund Office would not have fiduciary 
accountability.” Second, we are not sure, but we suspect that this may not be possible under 
current World Bank policies for financial intermediary trust funds. The Bank cannot 
supervise a recipient-executed trust fund under rules other than its own. Can the Bank 
provide a monitoring and reporting service sufficient for the Fund donors in conjunction with 
a financial intermediary trust fund? We are not sure that this is possible under current 
policies. Are there any precedents? If not, option 3 would require changes in these policies 
by the World Bank’s Board, which they may not agree to. Even if the World Bank were to 
agree, it seems that both programmatic and financial oversight would be light under option 3. 
It is not clear, for example, who would seek to standardize financial management practices 
across the CGIAR System. 
We agree with the concerns expressed that the current three levels of contracts is impeding 
the flow of W1-2 funds from the CGIAR Fund donors to the participating Centers in the 
various CRPs. We think it should be possible (under options 1-2) to have a Joint Agreement-
type framework between the Fund Council and the Consortium Board that is also signed by 
the Centers and that would thereby eliminate the need for a Program Implementation 
Agreement in addition to the Joint Agreement. In this way, the Fund Council would contract 
directly with each Lead Center for each CRP, while the Consortium would retain overall 
programmatic and fiduciary responsibility for the CRPs. We note that funds are already 
flowing directly from the Trustee to the Centers, upon the approval of the Fund Council. 
Regarding option 4, we note that this would create a “two masters” problem, with the 
CGIAR Office reporting to both the Consortium Board and the Fund Council. We think that 
the CGIAR Office would be too conflicted to serve both masters effectively. 
Regarding option 5, we note that institutional reform is path-dependent — that is, dependent 
on the path of previous institutional choices made, not simply on current conditions. 
Effective governance is not only a function of organizational charts and terms of references, 
but also on the history and culture of an organization. Drastic governance changes are costly. 
Moving to a one-board structure from a two-board structure (that has been painfully 
installed) may trigger a flurry of additional changes and not give the system the stability and 
calm that it badly needs.  
As mentioned in our previous comments, the CGIAR should note what happened to GAVI 
when it moved from a two-board structure to a one-board structure in 2008 — merging the 
former GAVI Board and GAVI Fund Board into the GAVI Alliance Board. This 
fundamentally changed the nature of GAVI partnership from an informal alliance to a formal, 
corporate entity, in which the influence of the UN founding partners (UNICEF, WHO, and 
the World Bank) has diminished considerably. Some now view GAVI as primarily serving 
the interests of the pharmaceutical industry. Many view skeptically GAVI’s emphasis on 
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making new vaccines available as quickly as possible, even if costly. The World Bank has 
largely withdrawn from GAVI, as the GAVI chair and CEO have been intolerant of contrary 
opinions on the GAVI Alliance Board, and UNICEF and WHO have largely become GAVI 
contractors rather than partners. Like happened in the case of GAVI, moving to a one-board 
structure could transform the CGIAR from a collective action entity, bringing the partners 
together out of a common interest, to a hierarchical top-down organization like GAVI has 
become. 
The IEA 
We have the following comments on selected paragraphs in this section: 
Paras. 257-8. We agree that the IEA was created in part to reduce the number of donor-
commissioned evaluations and reviews. While donors do continue to commission evaluations 
and reviews outside the current structure, these are typically evaluations of individual 
research projects, not program-level evaluations like the CRP evaluations. This does not 
represent duplication. Donors are not commissioning CRP evaluations, and CRP evaluations 
are usefully drawing upon the project-level evaluations that the donors have commissioned.  
There is however a gap in the current structure — namely, the evaluation of the CGIAR 
Centers. While CRP evaluations can be expected, over time, to cover most of the 
programmatic work of Centers, they cannot be expected to cover Center governance, and 
central Center functions such as administration, human resources, legal, finance, 
communication, fundraising, etc. While EPMRs in the pre-reform CGIAR were focused on a 
single Center, CRP evaluations usually cover many Centers and partners and cannot dig 
deeply into each Center’s governance and management operations. The Internal Audit Unit 
may be filling some of this gap. 
Para. 259. We agree that the effort to complete CRP evaluations prior to the call for the 
second round of CRP proposals has revealed a bottleneck in their finalization process. 
Therefore, the proposed functions of the Fund Council (para. 137 or 198) should also include 
“receiving CRP evaluation reports.” And the proposed functions of the Fund Office (para. 
155 or 201) should also include supervising management responses to CRP evaluations, and 
regular reporting on the progress in implementing the agreed recommendations.  
Para. 260. The third sentence says that “each of the CRPs has or is developing an 
independent science panel with a role in monitoring program strategy and performance, 
including recommending periodic reviews.” Was this intended to refer to “independent 
steering committees” per the recent (January 2015) agreement between the Fund Council and 
the Consortium Board on the governance of CRPs in the second generation of CRPs? Neither 
FTA nor PIM has an independent science panel, nor are they planning to establish one to our 
knowledge.  
Paras. 261-2. We do not agree with the recommendation of the MTR that the review of the 
quality of research should be under the oversight of the ISPC, if this means removing the 
assessment of research effectiveness and quality of science from CRP evaluations. Research 
(or development) effectiveness and organizational effectiveness are two inter-dependent 
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components of program-level evaluations, based on our experience of evaluating or 
reviewing more than 30 global and regional partnership programs over the last ten years. 
Their assessments cannot be so easily separated since research (or development) 
effectiveness is dependent to a considerable degree on organizational effectiveness. It’s also 
not clear what problem the MTR recommendation was trying to solve. Where is the evidence 
that CRP evaluations are not doing a good job of evaluating research effectiveness and 
quality of science? Therefore, the IEA should maintain the lead role in program-level 
evaluations, while cultivating stronger links with the ISPC.  
Para. 266. There are four internationally recognized standards for independence in 
evaluation: organizational independence, behavioral independence, protection from outside 
interference, and avoidance of conflicts of interest. This paragraph is essentially suggesting 
that it is possible to compromise organizational independence and rely on the behavioral 
independence of the evaluators to ensure overall independence. But why compromise 
organizational independence if it is not necessary to do so? While this may be common 
practice — but not best practice — in many organizations and partnerships, this is only 
because it is unavoidable in their particular circumstances, such as paying for a program-
level evaluation out of the trust fund that is supporting a program when the program 
management unit has signing authority for that trust fund. 
Para. 267. The two sentences in this paragraph are misleading, incomplete, and inaccurate. 
The GEF and the CGIAR are part of a trend among large global partnership programs to 
establish an independent evaluation office. To point to other large partnerships that have not 
yet done so without investigating why they have not done so is like saying that farmers 
should not adopt improved seed varieties because most farmers have not yet adopted them. 
This situation is true of all innovations. 
The Five-Year Evaluation of the Global Fund (completed in 2009) was not carried out by the 
Global Fund Secretariat. It was overseen by the Technical Evaluation Reference Group (a 
subcommittee of the Global Fund Board) with secretariat support from the Global Fund 
Secretariat. But this created problems towards the end of the evaluation when the Secretariat 
was reorganized under new leadership that showed less interest in and support for the TERG. 
The new CEO terminated the two staff positions that had been supporting the Five-Year 
Evaluation, and the Global Fund did not issue a formal management response to the 
evaluation until 12 months after the final Synthesis Report was issued.1 
Nor was the Independent Evaluation of the Climate Investment Funds (completed in 2014) 
carried out by the CIF Secretariat. This was carried out by an Evaluation Oversight 
Committee of the independent evaluation offices of the five Multilateral Development Banks 
that were participating the CIF. The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) has established 
a similar evaluation oversight committee for its currently ongoing evaluation.  
                                                 
1. Chris Gerrard, Rolf Korte, and Elaine Wee-Ling Ooi, “Case Study on the Five-Year Evaluation of the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,” presented at the Workshop on Comprehensive Evaluations, 
Paris, June 2012.  
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The essential reason why the CIF, the GPE, and the Global Agriculture and Food Security 
Program have not established independent evaluation offices is that they themselves are not 
independent legal entities. Each is hosted by the World Bank. Yet, as illustrated immediately 
above, the CIF and GPE still put in place practices to ensure independence of the evaluation 
from their respective secretariats, absent such independent evaluation offices. 
Other Comments 
Para. 236. One could mention some other benefits of having the ISPC, IEA, and GFAR 
located in FAO, namely the privileges and immunities that staff and consultants enjoy 
working for United Nations organizations. This, and the ability to recruit internationally for 
the best persons, could be lost if these are moved, as suggested in para. 247 (under options 4 
and 5). 
Para. 299. The last sentence says that approximately $500 million flows directly from 
contributors to Centers. If one includes W3 funding as well (because W3 funds are more 
similar to bilateral than to W1-2 funds), this adds up to $643 million according to the 2013 
CGIAR Financial Report, or 65 percent of total CGIAR revenues being received from donors 
that are not CGIAR Fund donors, or not represented by the same internal units that represent 
the CGIAR Fund donors on the Fund Council. That almost two-thirds of System funding 
stems from bilateral and Window 3 donors has important implications for System governance 
(in addition to the need to represent Centers on the Consortium Board): 
 Strategic direction-setting, performance management targets, and portfolio 
management cannot be decided unilaterally by Fund Council members (as long as it 
covers significant bilaterally funded program segments), but need to be 
formulated/deliberated with the participation/consultation of the bilateral donor group 
(as defined above). 
 The bilateral donor group needs to be motivated to shift their funds to the CGIAR 
funding windows or to place their bilateral grants consciously into CRP frameworks 
(e.g. if domestic accountability requirements do not allow shifting to W1-2).  
Both the FTA and PIM evaluations found inadequate recognition of the responsibilities and 
decision-making limitations ensuing from the fact that a large part of the CRP portfolio is 
bound to a diverse group of bilateral donors, each with its own preferences and priorities. 
System- and CRP-level governance structures and priority-setting and decision-making 
processes urgently need to take this reality into account.   
One concrete measure to achieve this would be to invite the bilateral donor group (as defined 
above) to the joint FC/CB meetings under option 2, and to organize similar meetings 
(between Window 1, 2, 3 and bilateral donors) for specific CRPs. It could also be considered 
to invite major bilateral donors to selected parts of CB and FC meetings. 
Overview of other global partnerships — paras. 37–45 and Annex H. We find that this 
information is presented rather mechanically without much context or analysis to draw 
appropriate lessons for the CGIAR.  
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14. The CGIAR has some features that distinguish it from the six comparator 
partnerships. These differences need to be taken into account when learning from the 
envisaged comparative benchmarking. For example, 
 GAVI and the Global Fund have large secretariats because they are supervising their 
own activities. Unlike the CGIAR and the other comparators, they do not utilize 
implementing agencies as intermediaries. Their Executive Directors have a strong 
role and a strong public profile because they are in charge of such large secretariats. 
 That the GEF CEO is co-chair of the GEF Council dates from the restructuring the GEF 
in 1994. It is unlikely that such an arrangement would be agreed to today, given the 
increased recognition of the importance of separating the chair of the governing body 
from the head of the secretariat in non-profit organizations. Requiring the independent 
chair to dedicate a significant amount of time to board duties and to advocacy — as in the 
Global Fund and the GPE — is indeed a growing practice among non-profits.  
 The 15 CGIAR Centers are doing research on development. All six comparator 
partnerships are supporting actual development interventions, downstream from research. 
That is, CGIAR-supported activities are further removed from the ultimate beneficiaries 
of their activities, and therefore require different metrics to assess their performance. As 
we pointed out in our first set of comments, this also requires to formulate the SRF in a 
realistic way, including performance results targets that represent that still can firmly be 
attributed to research activities. The current set of targets that include development 
outcomes and impact are not suitable for results based management of research. 
 The six comparator partnerships are working first and foremost with recipient-country 
governments. This helps to explain why donor and recipient country governments 
make up the majority of the voting representation on their governing bodies — as on 
the Fund Council, but not on the Consortium Board. The CGIAR sees itself as 
financing global investments for global public goods; the six comparator partnerships 
are largely financing national investments for global public goods. 
 The 15 Centers are independent legal entities. They will continue to be responsible, 
among other things, for human resource management, supervision of individual 
research projects, and quality assurance. The CRPs were never intended to take over 
these responsibilities. 
 While the GEF and the CTF also rely on implementing agencies to supervise the 
implementation of the projects that they finance, their implementing agencies (such as 
the World Bank, the other MDBs, and UNDP) have their own portfolio of 
environmental projects which far exceeds those financed by the GEF and the CTF, 
respectively — in the case of the World Bank by a ratio of 20 to 1. The World Bank, 
the other MDBs, and UNDP would never consider themselves to be only a part of an 
environmental network headed by the GEF and the CTF. Even with W1-2 funds 
representing 35 percent of CGIAR revenues, that the Reform tried to steer the direction 
of the research in the entire CGIAR System would be a bit like the GEF trying to steer 
the World Bank’s entire environmental lending with its GEF grant resources. 
